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Mind Invasion: Situated Affectivity
and the Corporate Life Hack
Jan Slaby*
Philosophy, Free University Berlin, Berlin, Germany
In view of the philosophical problems that vex the debate on situated affectivity, it can
seem wise to focus on simple cases. Accordingly, theorists often single out scenarios in
which an individual employs a device in order to enhance their emotional experience, or
to achieve new kinds of experience altogether, such as playing an instrument, going to
the movies, or sporting a fancy handbag. I argue that this narrow focus on cases that fit
a “user/resource model” tends to channel attention away from more complex and also
more problematic instances of situated affectivity. Among these are scenarios in which
a social domain draws individuals into certain modes of affective interaction, often by
way of attunement and habituation to affective styles and interaction patterns that are
normative in the domain in question. This can lead to a phenomenon that is not so much
“mind extension” than “mind invasion”: affectivity is dynamically framed and modulated
from without, often contrary to the prior orientations of the individuals in question. As
an example, I discuss affective patterns prevalent in today’s corporate workplace. I claim
that workplace affect sometimes contributes to what is effectively a “hack” of employees’
subjectivity.
Keywords: affect, emotion, situatedness, scaffolding, mind invasion, normativity, workplace
INTRODUCTION
Imagine you begin as an inexperienced intern in a large company. Whatever the details of your
task, it is likely that your first days in the firm will be marked by experiences like the following:
You find the regular employees speaking, acting, moving, and comporting themselves in ways that
are unfamiliar to you in various ways. Not only will their work routines be new to you, but also
their styles of interacting, of comporting themselves, of resonating affectively with one another, the
ways of address, of conversing with superiors, the use of humor to begin a conversation or deflate a
moment of tension, when and how to display certain feelings openly (enthusiasm maybe, or pride
after an achievement), or suppressing others (no fear, no insecurities), and so on. Accordingly,
muchmore will be required of you than learning how the regular work routines are to be performed.
You will have to habituate in various informal ways as well, in order to become “one of them,”
where this being “one of them” will crucially include numerous forms of affective comportment
and a particular affective style.
Now imagine that, after a successful internship, you get hired as a full-time employee and after
a few month or years on the job, you find yourself assigned to assist an incoming intern on her first
days in the firm. Seeing the novice stagger around the office insecurely, unsure even of how to talk,
how to sit, when to smile, whom (and how) to ask for advice, it occurs to you how profoundly you
yourself have been inculcated into the company’s specific “style of play” (a mixture of doing and
being, always on display). You might recall how strange it all was to you on your first days there,
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and how remarkably easy it now all comes to you. On a moment’s
reflection, you might also begin to see how profound and
encompassing the habituation in this work environment actually
is. For an instant, you grasp how much goes unquestioned: the
ways co-workers are expected to display energy, eagerness, and
enthusiasm, how everybody is conspicuously ready to work long
hours, how firmly employees have subscribed to their divisions’
goals (so that it can seem that they literally suffer or rejoice in
line with the current fortunes of the company), how decidedly
informal, loose, and casual conversation with those at the upper
echelon is supposed to go, while it leaves remarkably little room
for voicing dissenting opinion, how little tolerance for time spent
oﬄine, or how hard it is to find an open ear for concerns outside
of issues of immediate relevance to work, and so on. Indeed, this
is an alien land for the novice, and what seems natural here might
look quite unnatural—contingent, tendentious, even outrightly
hostile—from the outside.
I stop this little fictional excursion into the corporate world at
this point. With it, I want to point to one of those expanded zones
of contemporary life in which human affectivity is profoundly
framed and modulated so that the affective and emotional
dispositions of an individual squarely fall in line with the
interaction routines prevalent in these domains. The corporate
workplace is just one exemplary area among others—a field of
in-depth affective modulation. Something similar goes on in
higher education, in the world of sports, in various social-web-
based subcultures, in academic departments, let alone in those
classic fields of existential modulation as the military, police
forces, or the ever-expanding security sector, and so forth. What
characterizes these social domains in general is that they both
demand and effect profound shaping of personality, importantly
including affectivity. Considerations of the ways these formative
social domains operate, how individuals get habituated by them,
how individual comportment, affective styles, and these field’s
process routines intermingle, are by and large absent from recent
discussions of situated affectivity in philosophy. This is part of the
reason for a certain one-sidedness, not to say short-sightedness,
of the otherwise helpful literature on the topic. In what follows,
I will take some steps toward amending this situation, first
by reviewing recent work on situated affectivity, and then by
sketching a constructive proposal, geared to the complexity of
cases such as affect in the contemporary white-collar workplace.
The focal issue turns on widening the scope of the debate to
encompass the subjectification effects of social domains. I will
argue that the individual subject whose affectivity is said to be
situated, embedded or even extended is herself already a complex
“product” of the sustained modulation by affect-intensive social
domains. Affective habituation continues throughout adult life,
with potentially deep impacts on individuals who often have
little choice but to let themselves be variously framed in these
ways. Thus, part of my claim is that certain forms of socially
distributed affectivity—such as the emotional style and modes
of affective engagement prevalent in a corporate workplace,
crucially supported and enabled by technology and other kinds
of material arrangement—are prior to and formative of individual
emotion repertoires and affective-bodily styles, which themselves
are part and parcel of shifting structures of subjectivity.
If we change the perspective on situated affectivity in this
way, a range of cases comes in view in which it might be more
accurate to speak of “mind invasion” than of “mind extension”
(see Protevi, 2013, ch. 5). Here, individuals do not willingly strife
to enlarge their mental repertoire by coupling to external devices
in order to think better or feel more (“mind extension”; see
Clark, 1997; Clark and Chalmers, 1998; Menary, 2010). Rather,
social domains in which specific affective modes of interaction
are prevalent and functional, effectively “seek out” domain-naïve
individuals in order to turn them into bona fide exponents of
the domain’s operative processes. These novices’ minds might get
“hacked,” so to speak, especially when individual inclinations or
liabilities are specifically targeted so that these persons will come
to feel and comport themselves seamlessly in line with domain-
conducive routines, or even adjust their habits such that pursuit
of the domain’s objectives will seem natural to them. If this goes
discernibly against these individuals’ prior orientations, and if it
is in the long run detrimental to their personal flourishing, we
deal with a case of “mind invasion.” I will argue that several
manifestations of technology-supported affective interaction in
today’s white-collar workplace are cases in point.
AFFECTIVITY, AFFECT AND
EMOTION—INITIAL CONCEPTUAL
SORTING
In order to prepare for the specific discussion of situated
affectivity, some brief remarks on the relevant understanding of
affect, affectivity, and emotion will be helpful at the outset. For
one, I approach the field of affective phenomena with an inclusive
orientation, taking affective phenomena to span everything from
categorical emotion types with specific intentional contents (such
as anger, fear, happiness or shame), via the initially nameless, pre-
intentional affective dynamics of social interaction, to unspecific
moods, background feelings, or affective atmospheres. Much of
my specific angle of interest in this article concerns affect in
the sense of intensive transpersonal dynamics that link various
interactants while also anchoring them in their surroundings.
This understanding of affect, prevalent especially in the field
of cultural “affect studies” (e.g., Massumi, 2002; Gregg and
Seigworth, 2010), can then be differentiated further into the
following three closely connected subclasses:
1. Occurrent episodes of situated affecting and being affected
(ongoing scenes of affective intra-action)
2. Individual affective dispositions in the sense of a person’s
standing capacity to affectively resonate in specific ways (see
Mühlhoff, 2015); and
3. Social-institutional patterns of domain-inherent affectivity, for
instance the particular “affective climate” or default mode(s) of
affective relatedness that characterize a corporate workplace,
partly in virtue of its specific design, equipmental layout, and
regular operating procedures (see e.g., Gregg, 2011).
Part of the point of the following considerations is that these
three dimensions are densely interrelated, notably in the outside-
in direction: i.e., a particular sustained “affective arrangement”
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 2 February 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 266
Slaby Mind Invasion
prevalent in a social domain (type 3 above) regularly evokes
both occurrent scenes of affective relatedness (type 1) and
thereby, over time, habituates individuals’ standing capacities or
dispositions to affect and be affected in specific ways (type 2).
While not in the foreground of this paper, a roughly similar
story might be told for categorical emotion types and individual
emotion repertoires, only that more emphasis must then be
placed on the intentional contents or content templates of the
emotion types under consideration (see Ahmed, 2004; Wetherell,
2012).
As will become clear from the various examples discussed
below, affect and emotion are never merely matters of “internal
mental states,” nor just narrow ways of being affected, but
usually encompass sequences of active engagement with the
world, usually in highly social and relational ways (see Slaby
and Wüschner, 2014). This alone makes them adequate targets
of normative assessments, as it might be asked whether a
given sequence of affective engagement properly aligns with
the particular range of activities, interactions or expressions
permissible (or otherwise sanctioned) in the relevant social
domain. More than that, usually it can be asked whether the
affective sequence in question is conducive to realizing “the
point” of the domain in which (or as part of which) it unfolds, i.e.,
whether the affective episode is sufficiently significant to what is
ultimately at issue and at stake in the domain (while bearing in
mind that these domain-specific issues and stakes are themselves
open to normative contestation, continuous refinement, eventual
revision and even abandonment; see Rouse, 2015, ch. 10).
As these all too brief terminological and conceptual
clarifications indicate, affectivity, and emotion present a complex
field of phenomena which is notoriously contested. Thus, no
final word is ever to be expected on how best to carve up this
field. Accordingly, it is advisable for scholars to selectively focus
on significant aspects in precise ways and design a conceptual
map that is both: sufficiently in line with key insights and
developments in the broader field of affect research, but also
specific enough to take up and bring into sharp relief those
features of the target phenomenon that are most relevant to
addressing one’s particular research interest. In the present case,
this means (among other things) that forms of dynamic social-
relational affectivity instead of individual emotional episodes
should be at the forefront of attention1.
SITUATED AFFECTIVITY: STATE OF THE
ART
Recent philosophical discussions of situated affectivity harbor
important insights, as they have led to a fundamental perspective
shift in the philosophy of emotion. Affects and emotions
are no longer seen as merely a matter of organism-bound
1With this foregrounding of non-categorical, dynamic, relational instances of affect
as opposed to categorical types of emotion, my approach overlaps substantively
with the field of cultural affect studies, as it likewise emphasizes the often pre-
reflexive and not-yet-individualized and not-yet-classified intra-active processes
between bodies of various kinds (see Blackman, 2012 for a genealogical tracing
of this line of work, and on its sometimes conflict-ridden relation to more
mainstream strands of emotion theory; see also Wetherell, 2012).
processes but are now considered to be decisively supported
and, arguably, at times even partly constituted by structures or
processes in the emoter’s environment (Griffiths and Scarantino,
2009; Thompson and Stapleton, 2009; Slaby, 2014; Krueger,
2014a; Colombetti and Roberts, 2015). This idea has led
to a number of fruitful developments and inspired much
interdisciplinary exchange. Some recent publications have begun
to further clarify the conceptual landscape in this area—for
example rendering more precise the meanings of terms such
as an emotion’s presumed embodiment, embeddedness, and
extendedness (Wilutzky et al., 2011; Stephan et al., 2014). These
clarifications might have curbed the excitement of the enthusiasts
somewhat, as they have set the bar quite high for attempts to
establish cases of genuine affectivemind extension. But they have
not stopped the flurry of work about affect’s situatedness more
broadly. Several recent publications have analyzed in detail a
wide range of example scenarios, assessing to what extent these
deserve to be called cases of “affective scaffolding” or even of
“extended emotion” (see e.g., Krueger, 2014a,b; Candiotto, 2015;
Colombetti and Krueger, 2015; Carter et al., 2016 and also several
contributions to this Frontiers special topic).
In the present section, I will review some key strands of this
literature. I restrict my discussion to approaches that stop short
of the strong thesis of “extended emotion.” While I think that
the extended emotions perspective still deserves a fair run for its
money (contra some of its recent critics), a less radical proposal
suffices for my present purposes.
Griffiths and Scarantino’s Emotions in the
Wild
The recent surge of literature on situated affectivity was
kicked off by a programmatic paper entitled Emotions in the
wild by Griffiths and Scarantino (2009). In it, the authors
propose a naturalistic, social-psychology-, and evolutionary-
biology-inspired account of emotions as strategic moves
within social relationships that are profoundly embedded
within environmental structures, both synchronically and
diachronically. Besides bringing the topic of situated affectivity
on the agenda and making a convincing case for their proposal,
Griffiths and Scarantino deserve credit for not framing the topic
from the outset in the terms of the extended mind debate
(e.g., in the terms set down by Clark and Chalmers, 1998;
see also Clark, 2008, 2009). By remaining neutral about the
question of whether the environment can literally “extent”—in
the sense of “become of a constitutive part of”—the individual
mind, they circumvent many of the difficulties that trouble that
debate. Instead, they emphasize the less ontologically committing
notion of environmental scaffolding. An external scaffold—a
concept introduced by Clark (1997) with a nod to (Vygotsky,
1986 [1962])—is any item or structure in the environment
that provides reliable support for cognitive processes, so that
cognitive routines will regularly exploit these structures to
enhance their functionality and effectiveness. Prime examples
are public language and other symbol systems and notations,
but also other artifacts such as computers, calculators, or the
infrastructures of communication, and likewise the devices and
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tricks of various “arts of memory” or related material practices of
mind, reaching back into ancient history (see also Donald, 1991;
Sutton, 2010). Expanding this notion of scaffolding to encompass
affectivity seems like a natural move to make (Colombetti and
Krueger, 2015).
What is furthermore helpful is Griffiths and Scarantino’s
understanding of emotions as temporally expanded active
engagements with—instead of merely snapshot-like passive
experiences of—the world, and especially the social world. A view
along these lines is gaining renewed currency in recent years, long
since it had been proposed by phenomenologists such as Sartre
or Merleau-Ponty.2 This highlights the way in which affectivity
might be a matter of repeated acts of active structuring of the
environment by an agent or a group of agents, with the aim to
achieve relational goals and to effect changes in the world that
are conducive to the agents’ favored course of future action and
experience.
In line with this understanding of affectivity as active
engagement, Griffiths and Scarantino take up important insights
from recent work in the sociology and social psychology of
emotion (especially from Parkinson et al., 2005), in which the
entanglement of individual affective comportments with social
practices, group processes or even culture at large is a prominent
theme. The upshot that Griffiths and Scarantino’s account
shares with these strands of work is that individual emotions
are complex strategies of relationship configuration within
communal life, embedded within substantive environmental
support structures. Candidate affective scaffolds are things as
diverse as items of material culture, engrained communal
interaction practices and rituals, or even parts of the institutional
set-up of a society—such as property rights, laws etc. Moreover,
Griffiths and Scarantino’s distinction between a diachronic and
synchronic dimension of these embedding structures provides
a valuable methodological directive for further work: these two
dimensions make for separate strands of analysis in a candidate
case of situated affect, thus informing about both, direct on-going
(“on-line”) environmental shaping of affective processes and the
longer-term historical development of the support structures in
question.
Affective Scaffolding and Niche
Construction Theory
Colombetti and Krueger (2015) have expanded upon the
groundwork provided by Griffths and Scarantino with their own
proposal on affective scaffolding, inspired by the philosopher
of biology Sterelny (2010, 2012). They follow Sterelny in
transposing work in evolutionary niche construction theory (cf.
Odling-Smee et al., 2003; Odling-Smee and Laland, 2009) to
human social life, then adding affectivity to the mix to enrich
the picture of the socially scaffolded mind. Niche construction
amounts to a more theoretically developed approach to
environmental scaffolding, as the biological notion of ecological
niche allows a systematic understanding of the ways in which
organisms and environments come to be structurally entangled
2See Slaby and Wüschner (2014) and Wilutzky (2015) for fresh takes on the
agentive nature of emotion and affectivity.
in ever more intricate ways over evolutionary time. The crucial
advance of niche construction theory over earlier paradigms of
adaptationism is the idea of recursive developmental interaction
between organisms and their environment. Instead of a linear
story of a species’ stepwise adaptation to an environment
considered more or less stable, niche construction approaches
hold that organisms modify their habitats in various ways while
their own functional designs continue to be shaped by the
layout of their respective niche. Thus, we end up with complex
co-construction processes of organisms and environments. An
exemplary case is again language, originally a cultural technique
to which present-day human nervous systems are complexly
adapted so that it is pointless to ask whether language was
ultimately “cultural” or “biological” (Deacon, 1997). This insight
generalizes to many other human capacities if the niche
construction approach is on the right track.
Colombetti and Krueger apply Sterelny’s approach to
affectivity. Accordingly, they discuss several cases of affective
niches. What Colombetti and Krueger chiefly discuss under the
label of an “affective niche” are subdomains of human social life;
domains such as popular music, the cinema, religion, or areas
of consumer culture. For instance, music and the various socio-
technological arrangements that enable, frame and enhance the
listening experience, is an obvious case in point: a subdomain
of social life that is effective in engendering recurring affective
experiences. But even a case as mundane as the mood-dependent
selection of clothing—such as putting on a brightly colored attire
to counter the dullness of a rainy day—comprises a candidate
affective niche in these authors’ liberal proposal (Colombetti
and Krueger, 2015, 1163). A further, surprising case is that
of a handbag and its personalized, presumably affect-inducing
contents:
A handbag—including its contents—functions as a highly
portable, self-styled collection of technologies specifically chosen
for regulating affect: charms and tokens for good luck and peace of
mind, which influence one’s appraisal of, and ability to cope with,
specific situations; photos, assortedmementos (such as old theatre
tickets and restaurant receipts), snippets of notes, and letters
from loved ones that bring about fond memories of individuals
and elicit specific feelings; and small weapons or tools that affect
one’s awareness of one’s action possibilities, which accordingly
generate feelings of confidence, power, and security. (Colombetti
and Krueger, 2015, 1163).
This description of the handbag as a portable, customized affective
niche helps bring home the pervasiveness of such forms of
affective scaffolding in general, both in the private spaces of
the home and in the designed spaces of civilized life (cinemas,
shopping malls, event arenas of sports and entertainment,
modern workplaces, etc.). It also accentuates the relevance of
material culture to affective scaffolding, a theme so far under-
appreciated in the philosophy of emotion.
Such a broad array of examples might raise doubts: If just
any odd affect-inducing object were an instance of affective
scaffolding, the proposal would be vacuous. Trust, entrenchment
and individualization are the criteria discussed by Colombetti
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and Krueger that distinguish occasional affect inducers from
those sustained and regular ones that deserve to be called
“affective scaffolds.” Accordingly, habitual gaming and the
affective “flow” and pleasurable absorption it reliably enables is
a case of affective scaffolding, likewise entertainment events and
various items of interior design in their purposeful arrangement.
On the other hand, waking up in a cheerful mood because the
morning sun happens to color my room brightly is not, neither is
the occasional smile of a fellow traveler on the tube that might
cheer me up for a few moments. The affect-inducing handbag
qualifies, not least because forgetting to take it alongmight lead to
“the sensation that something is missing, that I am not complete
(. . . ) it’s as if I were amputated” (Kaufmann, 2011, 157 quoted in
Colombetti and Krueger, 2015, 1165).
More relevant for present purposes are cases of interpersonal
affective scaffolding. Concerning these, Colombetti and Krueger
discuss various examples where the regular company of others—
such as loved ones or friends—brings about positive feelings in
reliable ways that can become deeply entrenched, that are trusted
and play out in personalized ways, as in certain interactional
styles or repeated forms of humorous exchange. This brings into
play a broad array of scenarios, from the mildly comforting
feelings of familiarity we have in the presence even of co-workers
or casual acquaintances to the intensive emotions and deep
background feelings we experience in the presence of our dearest
companions.
Colombetti and Krueger provide a broad overview, starting
from early infant-caregiver affective interactions and going all
the way up to the socially orchestrated material design of
public spaces, such as churches. Places of worship—to stick
with the authors’ own example—not only function so as to
reliably induce awe, solemnity or joy, but do this in ways
that are subject to deliberate modification that respond to
changing tastes or needs (see Colombetti and Krueger, 2015,
1172).
A central ingredient in the authors’ account of affective
scaffolding and niche construction is the capacity of individuals
to develop, display and adjust certain “bodily-affective styles.”
With this concept, adopted with modifications from Husserl
and Merleau-Ponty, Colombetti and Krueger begin to theorize
the “interfacing” or complex entanglement between individual
comportment and the various affective niches that make up the
social world:
Important for our purposes is the fact that one’s style is not
fixed; rather, we exhibit different styles in different niches. For
example, contrast how one’s style transforms when teaching a
classroom full of undergraduates, say, with interacting with one’s
partner or children, meeting professional colleagues for the first
time, or going out for the evening with a group of old friends.
Certain styles only seem to manifest—(...)—when scaffolded by
the presence of specific social groups. (Colombetti and Krueger,
2015, 1169).
This notion of affective-bodily style with its oscillation between
the relative stability of habit and the relative versatility required
by multiple belongings to social spheres addresses an important
theoretical desideratum. Part of the point is that these bodily-
affective styles are not exclusively anchored within individual
comportment and expression, but that they can be shared by
the members of an in-group, such as a family, a sports team
or an office work group, and that something like them can
inhere communal places or social domains in the form of a
recurring pattern of affective interaction that is condensed into
an atmosphere or emotional climate. What also comes in view
here is a certain situational “porousness” of the embodied subject
as it traverses between different spheres of affective belonging
(see Blackman, 2012). Due to its role as a dynamic “transit
zone” between individual, social group, and material niche, the
notion of affective-bodily style is specifically relevant to my own
proposal developed in Sections The Socially Invaded Mind I:
Distributed Affectivity and The Socially Invaded Mind II: The
Case of Workplace Affect below.
MOVING BEYOND THE USER/RESOURCE
MODEL
Before I sketchmy own approach to situated affectivity, I will now
venture into a problematic that I think is relatively widespread in
the literature on situatedness, at least as a salient tendency at the
visible surface of these debates. Some of the work on the situated
mind and on situated affectivity is beset by a characteristic
inclination: what I call the predominance of the “user/resource
model.” Baseline mentality in many of the example cases under
discussion is that of a fully conscious individual cognizer
(“user”) who sets about pursuing a well-defined task through
intentional employment of a piece of equipment or exploitation
of an environmental structure (“resource”). This oft-recurring
scheme—particularly prevalent in Andy Clark style extended
mind theory—might be part of the reason for why proponents
of situated approaches have by and large failed to acknowledge
the potentially troublesome political issues that the situatedness
perspective might make visible.
To get a better sense of what I mean by the dominance
of the user/resource model, we have to look no further than
into the many fancy formulations that Andy Clark uses to gloss
the upshot of his extended mind position. Famed Alzheimer
patient Otto and his notebook (Clark and Chalmers, 1998),
humans as “chimps with Filofaxes” (Clark, 2002, 37), various
anecdotes starring the iPhone, or all sorts of other scenarios
where individuals navigate the demands of their high-octane
city and work life with an array of cognitive “props and aids”
such as laptops, mobile phones, or wearable tracking devices
(see e.g., Clark, 1997; 2008). Obviously, Clark also discusses the
embeddedness of cognitive agents in the broader environment as
an enduring support structure for their mental operations; still,
the chief cases are those where the intentional employment of an
isolated tool by an individual agent is at the center of attention3.
3Those approaches to the extendedmind that focus not on considerations of parity
(Clark and Chalmers, 1998), but instead on considerations of complementarity
(e.g., Menary, 2007) are less prone to succumb to simplistic user/resource thinking.
Complementarity approaches hold that cognitive agent and mind-extending
machinery, once brought together in the relevant way, do not continue as separate
existences but form a single integrated system. Accordingly, as long as this
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While their theory design is different from Clark’s, and
presumably more conducive to a structural reading, Colombetti
and Krueger also sometimes gravitate toward individual “tools
for feeling” scenarios in their examples. Even when they speak
of how churches changed their interior designs, decorations and
patterns of ritual as an apparent example of social scaffolding,
they invoke the demands of a new generation of worshippers
as pushing for these transformations—i.e., user demands as
dictating how religion is done in the 21st century. The famed
handbag case, the ways of relying on music in order to feel better
during tedious tasks such as workouts, or the affective practice
of engaging one’s interlocutors and friends by the well-dosed
employment of humor all fit into the user/resource grid. Likewise,
the relationship configuration approach favored by Griffiths and
Scarantino has more than a whiff of user/resource rhetoric about
it, although the authors surely do see the potential for a broader,
structural application. But even where the broader milieu is
explicitly acknowledged as a structural scaffold, there still seems
to be an urge to foreground individual intentions and individual
comportment, at least in many of the examples under discussion.
Historians of science and technology who begin to target the
1980s have linked this pattern of thinking—and the emergence of
the social type “user” in general—to the often close relationships
between Silicon Valley CEOs, engineers and marketers and
prominent cognitive scientists and philosophers of mind (e.g.,
Turner, 2006; Streeter, 2011). The individualist “user/resource”
model seems to be the natural way to think about human
subjectivity, in the libertarian-friendly, post-1980, California
style. I won’t go as far as to accuse Clark and others of
an outright advertising campaign for personal computing and
networked lifestyles—although the concerted efforts of Edge.org
and related pundit circles might give us pause (see Stadler,
2014). What I want to highlight is a certain one-sidedness, a
potential blind spot in recent work on situatedness, where the
individual with his or her interests, inclinations, intentions and
strategies is taken for granted as a starting point that is then
placed in purposeful conjunction with a technical device or an
environmental structure so that an effective coupled system of
“user-plus-tool” results. Modern city- and office-dwellers might
like to think of themselves in this presumably emancipated way
as sovereign agents in full control of their affairs. But besides a
dangerous tendency to naturalize the consumer as a template for
personhood, this way of thinking risks missing out on a large
variety of inadvertent structuring effects that happen outside or at
the fringes of our individual purview. The term “mind invasion”
is intended to capture some of the ways in which it is exactly
not my individual decision to employ a mind tool in the pursuit
of my self-avowed goals, but rather forms of pervasive framing
and molding effected by aspects of technical infrastructure and
institutional realities (Protevi, 2013; see also Verbeek, 2011).
new system operates, it is not a user going about her business with a suitable
tool, but rather a whole new “agent” or assemblage with a different range of
operational capacities. As I have argued elsewhere, there are good reasons to free
the extended mind approach from strict allegiance to the parity principle, and
for pushing it toward complementarity instead (Slaby, 2014). This aligns with the
following considerations in the main text, which mainly discuss cases of affective
subjectification.
In these cases, the relevant “affective intentionality” at play
in a given scenario is not the intentionality of the individuals
involved, but rather that which is structurally implemented in a
distributed manner in the social domain in question. The overall
affective dynamics prevalent in such scenes do have a point,
they might be oriented toward domain-specific operative goals,
and they likely display a systematic responsiveness to domain-
relevant goings-on, and this is not just a linear, bottom-up result
of the affective, or emotional orientations of the individuals
implicated in the domain’s activities (see below for a fuller
elaboration of this point).
The short-sightedness of the user/resource model is
sometimes complemented by a second troublesome tendency.
Like much work in the naturalistic strands of philosophy
of mind and the philosophy of cognitive science, authors
writing on the situatedness of the mind often seem unwilling
to sufficiently distinguish between a process-oriented and a
normative understanding of its subject matter (Cash, 2010;
Rouse, 2015). As has been pointed out countless times at least
since Frege’s attacks on psychologism, mind talk is systematically
ambiguous between an “operative process” and a “normative
status” understanding (these terms are helpfully brought up by
Rouse, 2015, ch. 1). It is clear that an approach to the human
mind worth its salt must be able to address both these dimension
without running them together at random (that this does not
happen very often is a different story; see Brandom, 2009). The
disinterest in normativity—or the hopeless presumption that
the computational theory of mind has somehow solved the
issue (Fodor, 2000)—has not boded well for the prospects of
recognizing the deep social framing of the mind, its constitutive
beholdenness to complex socio-normative patterns (be it
discursive practice or institutional structures such as the law; see
also Haugeland, 1998, 2002, the latter text being a direct critique
of Clark’s presumed norm-blindness)4.
These two blind spots are related. If you are inclined to
understand the mind in terms of operative processes alone,
it can seem natural to think of it in terms of an individual’s
inbuilt mental capacities being materially augmented, scaffolded,
or extended by some environmental resource. Thus, you easily
end up with something resembling the user/resource model. In
contrast, on a view of the human mind that takes sufficient
account of its normative dimension, where individual mental
states are more like public moves in a rule-governed game—or
like the commitments and entitlements accrued to the games’
players in virtue of their moves (see Brandom, 1994)—it will be
more natural to assume that complex socio-normative patterns
enable and constrain individual mental states, often in ways
4I can only briefly highlight the normativity issue here, stopping well short of a
theoretical proposal. A possible step in this could be to distinguish between the
prime philosophical sense of normativity (as prevalent in the broadly Kantian
tradition to which both Frege and Brandom belong) and the other, negatively
tainted employment of the term, where it is a matter of socially enforced
normalization rather than rational or moral validity (roughly, the Nietzsche-
Freud-Foucault trajectory). However, in line with both Haugeland (1998,2002)
and Rouse (2015) I deem it appropriate to hold these strands closely together;
both authors work toward views that attempt to reconcile the normativity and
normalization perspectives in a spirit of naturalism—what arguably had also been
part of Heidegger’s project in Being and Time (1962).
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that are not explicitly reflected-about—thereby transcending
the scope of the user/resource model. “Mind extension” would
then potentially expand to cover communal norms and social
institutions, for example in the ways discussed by work on the
“socially extended mind” (Gallagher and Crisafi, 2009; Cash,
2010).
This latter view will likely bring up further important
questions: Which of the many structuring demands imposed
by social domains are such that they deserve the participants’
reflective endorsement? And which are rather such that we see
them as infringing upon our freedom, as subtle (or not so
subtle) hindrances to our individual or collective flourishing, so
that they are in urgent need of reform or even abolishment? A
related question is then this: Do those affected have, individually
or collectively, in a given case of mental situatedness, enough
of a say in determining the further course that the technical
and institutional infrastructures will take? With this expanded
orientation we end up in the realm of the political—the
situatedness debate phases over into what I call a “political
philosophy of mind” (again, with much resonance to John
Protevi’s important groundwork; see Protevi, 2009, 2013; see also
Massumi, 2015). The question of the constitution of individual
mental capacities is here inseparable from the question of a
normatively adequate organization of socio-political reality at
large—where “normatively adequate” here means, at the very
least: worthy of reflective endorsement by those concerned.
In this sense, the human mind is a political matter as
much as anything (see also Rorty, 1988). For these reasons,
I applaud the moderate Hegelian turn that some authors in
the philosophy of cognitive science have recently pushed for
(Gallagher and Crisafi, 2009; Gallagher, 2013; Merritt et al.,
2013)5.
On a somewhat deeper level, this perspective brings into
view a problematic that is capable of making the situation even
more difficult, namely that there might not be fully constituted
“users”—i.e., autonomous individuals—to begin with, at least
in many concrete cases of mental resp. affective situatedness.
Instead, the environmental resource in question—including the
normative communal practices it figures in—will itself play a
role in bringing about and enabling the agent, and transforming
her or him in various ways. This material-discursive subject
constitution or “subjectification” is not restricted to early phases
of development, but it is a matter of effective framing and
re-molding of subjectivity and selfhood throughout adult life.
Just think of the deep impacts communication and networking
technologies have had on all our lives, affecting for good
attention spans, affective reward structures, relationship habits
in all sorts of ways. More pervasively still, think of gendering
practices that are rampant throughout the life span, affecting
all areas of human conduct and being (Young, 2005). So
this is another problematic tendency inherent in user/resource
5Of course, this might also inspire a consultation of the more immediate
descendants of a post-Hegelian critical perspective on subject constitution, such as
present-day exponents of Frankfurt-school critical theory, in particular their work
on “social pathologies” and the “paradoxes” inherent in currently salient capitalist
modes of subjectification. See e.g., Hartmann and Honneth (2006), Honneth
(2012).
approaches: the tendency to start from—and assume as largely
unproblematic—fully constituted human subjects that then
merely come to employ this or that environmental resource.
Outside of the more elaborate versions of niche construction
theory, relatively little attention has been paid to the ways
in which individual subjectivity is continuously shaped by
environmental structures, practices, machinery, norms and
institutions. This is the question of affective subjectification.
It likewise highlights the need for a more explicitly political
consideration of social niches, everyday practices and various
lifestyle technologies. And it brings the present approach in
correspondence with previous work on subjectification and the
“psychic life of power” (Butler, 1997; see also Foucaultr, 1995
[1975]; Guattari, 1995; Hacking, 2002; Allen, 2008; Haslanger,
2012 among others).
THE SOCIALLY INVADED MIND I:
DISTRIBUTED AFFECTIVITY6
A good way to begin thinking of instances of affectivity
outside the ambit of the user/resource model and that might
qualify as cases of “mind invasion” is to take a hint from the
debate on distributed cognition (e.g., Hutchins, 1995; Tribble,
2005; Tollefsen, 2006; Sutton, 2010). This has the advantage
of not restricting the ontological domain that presumably
realizes a given affective state to an individual bearer. When
Hutchins discusses a ship’s navigational capacities as realized
by the many separate contributory acts of the crew members,
or when Tribble invokes the intricate stage design and
material equipment of an early modern theater company to
explain its capacity to hold a staggering number of plays
in its active repertoire, it is clear that the overall state or
capacity in question is one that can be realized only by a
collective of individuals dealing in skillful and coordinated
ways with the proper kinds of equipment: “As in the expert
navigational cognition described by Hutchins, so in the Globe
[theatre’s] physical architecture, artifacts, social structure, and the
characteristics of the plays themselves combine to support the
collective success of the company in performance” (Sutton, 2010,
202).
In a helpful twist in the final part of their exploration of
different forms the situated affectivity perspective might take,
Stephan et al. (2014) apply the insights of the distributed
cognition framework to affectivity. They start out by giving the
surprisingly radical example, first invoked by Max Scheler, of a
mother and father at their child’s grave who “as a collective, share
(non-metaphorically) the same pain (Leid)” (Stephan et al., 2014,
76). This sounds remarkably close to a case of genuinely extended
emotion, otherwise dreaded by these authors. But let us not be
held up by exegetical intricacies. Other examples discussed in the
same paper are less controversial and more in line with what I
am driving at here. For instance, Stephan et al. speak of affective
atmospheres or the ongoing mutual shaping of affectivity during
6I have borrowed the phrase “socially invadedmind” and thus also the shorter gloss
“mind invasion” from John (Protevi, 2013), whose important groundwork taught
me much about how to think productively about socially machinated affect.
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the course of a social interaction, such as in a marital argument.
This is what they consider the systematic upshot:
Cases like these, where supra-individual systems are not (...)
composed of an individual coupled to some technical or non-
technical artifact or natural resource but by groups of interacting
individuals are the best candidates for affective phenomena that
cross an individual’s boundaries. (. . . ); the motivation for not
restricting affective phenomena of this kind to individuals (or
their brains) is that they are an essentially collective and emergent
affair. First, just as a vessel is not navigated by the navigator using
his shipmates as an extrabodily resource, but by the navigational
crew as a whole, (. . . ), the oppressive atmosphere that emerges
when a job interview doesn’t go well and becomes awkward or
the contagious euphoria or panic of a crowd do not have a single
individual as a bearer but are distributed over supra-individual
collectives of interacting individuals (. . . ) [T]hey are emergent in
the sense that the affective states and actions of each individual
member continuously and reciprocally influence each other and
are themselves shaped and amplified in a top-down manner by
the overall dynamics of the group as a whole. (Stephan et al., 2014,
77).
The outside-in model of situated affectivity that I favor can take
this as a starting point, and then focus especially on the ways in
which individual affectivity is recursively implicated within the
operations of distributed patters of affect—what Stephan et al.
indicate here by speaking of top-down shaping and amplifying
of individual affective states by the group’s overall affective
dynamic. The collective euphoria, team spirit and energized
motivational climate that might be prevalent in a workplace is
a good example. While on the one hand realized by the many
contributory affects, expressions, interactions, performances of
the individual employees, supported by structuring features of
the workplace such as architecture or purposefully arranged
equipment, this overall affective climate at the same time exerts
profound formative influences on the affective experiences and
affective engagements of the individuals that regularly dwell
therein. Understood in this way, such affect-intensive social
domains are a good candidate to render more concrete the
notions of an “affective niche” and of “affective scaffolding” as
invoked by Colombetti and Krueger.
This is a pervasive feature of organized social domains
in general: that they contain formative structures—such as
architecture, technological, and equipmental arrangements—
that enable and help sustain recurring practices, modes of
interaction and relational dynamics which, taken together,
“realize” or “implement” affective interaction patterns and
atmospheres. Often, these distributed affective patterns are
deliberately machinated so as to help the given domain reach its
operative goals, whatever these may be in the case at hand—for
instance profit-making in a company, winning in a sports team,
or good student performances in a school class, to take some
trivial examples. The military with its drills, disciplines, rituals
and command structures is another case in point (see Protevi,
2013, ch. 2), as are the countless ways in which commercial
enterprises—from shopping malls to entertainment complexes to
holiday resorts—generate consumption-friendly atmospheres or
implement other “technologies of allure” (Thrift, 2010)7.
This is recursive subject-formation or “existential
modulation” if anything is—individuals crucially contribute
to make up the social domains they are part of, but they are
themselves shaped and molded by these domains in turn.
Both goes on at the same time, in a myriad of intersecting and
overlapping ways—tiny contributory acts, the simultaneous
giving and receiving of form, shaping and being shaped.
Here applies the central message from philosophical work on
performativity (e.g., Butler, 1993): The countless contributory
acts which, taken together, make up human reality, and the
norms, rules and standards that presumably “apply” to this
human reality are not two separate spheres, ontologically
distinct. It is not embodied, physical reality on the one side and
abstract, ideal rules or “ideas” on the other—instead, acts and
rules, instances and patterns are co-constitutive, on the same
ontological plane. Norms exist only as concretely enacted and
situated, while there are no acts which are outside the ambit
of social rules and normative patterns. Even presumed norm
violations, outliers, perversions, or innovations have sense and
readability only in relation to the established normative patterns.
Applied to the human individual this obviously means that there
cannot be an individual outside the ambit of socio-normative
frameworks; there is literally “no body” who is not constitutively
framed and molded by socially prevailing rules and categories.
Butler (1993) has shown this in detail for the case of gender,
seconded by Iris Marion Young—among others—on the seriality
of social categorization (see e.g., Young, 2005, ch. 1). This
and related work has often been misread as poststructuralist
dissolution of solid human reality, while it is in fact a thorough
materialization of norms, ideas, and rules in the embodied
concretion of interactive material-discursive practices (see
Barad, 2003).
A key meta-insight that can be transferred from
performativity theory to studies of affectivity is the
acknowledgment that the adequate starting point for theorizing
human affectivity is not the isolated individual confronting
an affect-eliciting stimulus. The adequate starting point rather
is complex distributed affectivity already prevalent in a social
domain: the ongoing back and forth of affective interaction,
relational dynamics, patterns of affective engagement as it
7Some clarification is in order on my employment of the concept “social domain,”
as it plays a crucial role in the present account. It is difficult define and demarcate
social domains in a precise manner, as there are so many different varieties of
them—large and small, official and informal, persistent or transient, materially
circumscribed or just institutionally demarcated, in all sorts of different ways.
Minimally, there has to be some purposeful organization, temporal sustenance and
discernible boundary, however fuzzy and shifting, between inside and outside to a
bundle of social interactions (resp. practices), in order for the domain concept to
validly apply. I am using the term roughly in line with what Wittgenstein-inspired
practice theorist Ted Schatzki calls “social formation” (Schatzki, 1996, 199–201).
Schatzki also speaks of “integrative practices” (1996: 98–108) in the settings
and places these practices are both located in and help constitute. Importantly,
domains and practices—and accordingly, also affective interaction patterns—
are co-constitutively interrelated so that we cannot simply assign some spatial
or material setting to pre-existing practices or affective interactions. A crucial
source in the background is Heidegger, in particular his explication of “existential
spatiality” (Heidegger, 1962 [1927], §§23, 24).
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has solidified over time. It would be a severe simplification—
repeating the foundational myth of “abstract individualism” (see
Marx, 1973 [1858]; Foucault, 1998 [1967]) —to start with the
isolated individual and her presumed individual affective states,
and only then consider in what ways these individual affective
states might be further enhanced, expanded etc. by means of
certain interaction patterns, social norms, tools, resources,
or techniques in the environment. Instead, theorizing has to
start from a much more realistic—in the sense of: real-world
adequate—starting point. It is the assumption of in-medias-res
human sociality. There is no moment in the life of a human
being where it is not in formative exposure to ongoing, already
developed social activity (which of course includes all sorts
of affective interactions). Even an infant is situated in all but
a context-free, a-historic constellation. An infant’s sphere of
belonging is inevitably one that is massively pre-arranged, full
of epoch-, culture and milieu-specific habituations, discourses,
objects, norms and rules, styles of interaction, and much else (see
Mühlhoff, 2015).
But let us rather focus on affective interaction scenarios in
adulthood. Always already, in any domain or sphere of social
life whatsoever, there is the regular commerce, the established
“Betrieb” of affective interaction, to use (Heidegger, 1962 [1927])
apt term for domain-specific business-as-usual. Now a novice
comes in. Emotional contagion, various synchronic, mimetic
responses on a basic affective-bodily level combine with explicit
demands and sanctioning on part of the established domain
members to ensure the newcomer is soon swayed into and
attuned with the prevailing style of affective interaction, with
the affective modes of being demanded and prized by the
domain in question. People habituated in accordance with the
affective patterns prevalent in a social domain will reinforce
and sanction the novice’s affectivity from the outset, both
openly and in a variety of subtle, unremarkable, often pre-
or subconscious ways—by way of mimics, gesture, affective-
bodily styles that signal approval or disapproval, encourage
or discourage, reward with warm connection or punish with
subtle hostility. A seamless censoriousness inheres human
affectivity, exerted constantly in all sorts of small ways. Add to
it the various atmospheres, collective feeling tones and affective
styles and energy levels that inhere social places and spaces—
likewise helping to sway the novice over time into consonant
attunement.
Often, there is deliberate pre-selection: human resource
departments, recruitment offices, or admission committees come
equipped with selection procedures, tests and techniques make
sure that individuals with the right inclinations and also with
the right liabilities and “weak spots” are put in the right places,
i.e., those positions where they will likely be most efficient
for the company, army division or academic department. But
increasingly also, and this is not at all incidental, people get placed
where they themselves will likewise tend to feel most fitting and
comfortable.
The affective “life hack” is more than merely a structure
that helps corporations exploit their employees. It helps them
get the most out of their workers precisely by steering them
with precision into spots that present positive attachment
opportunities—specific affective niches, tailor-made to pre-
selected personality types or employee profiles. These affective
niches then stand a good chance of getting habituated to become
individual existential structures, aspects of the employees’
identity—self-exploitation might then unfold smoothly and with
a smile (it is “the soul at work,” see Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005;
Berardi, 2009).
This is why the concept of a “hack” is appropriate:
Workplace affect—the moods and affective atmospheres, the
affective styles of interaction, and also the ways that digital
and networked technologies machinate and channel affectivity—
make up complex structures of feeling that have been set up
with the express purpose of facilitating allegiance to modes of
comportment, even modes of being, that will in sum prove
conducive to the company’s goals (see Gregg, 2011). And what
is more, aren’t we all passionately attached to our various circles
of belonging, which encompass far more than what was formerly
the “personal sphere” of family, loved ones and friends? How
deep are our affective bonds to our workplace, to our “team,”
to our colleagues, to the various sweet machines that make our
work seamless, stylish and ubiquitous, and also to the spiritual
rewards we keep aspiring to—often despite better knowledge—in
the course of our imagined future journeys? These attachments
are complex, ambiguous, and often cruel. They are not easy to
shake for the simple reason that they are us (Berlant, 2012).
THE SOCIALLY INVADED MIND II: THE
CASE OF WORKPLACE AFFECT
In order to provide some more backing for these last remarks,
I close with a discussion of an example for a mind-invading
structure of feeling that is currently prevalent. Obviously, I can
only provide a rough sketch of what is a vast landscape of
phenomena. Consider what cultural theorist Melissa Gregg has
called the “presence bleed” of contemporary knowledge work
(aka “immaterial labor”): the tendency, decisively facilitated by
interactive technologies, that work time encroaches on what
formerly were off-hours—for instance, when office workers tend
to be online and available for work-related communication night
and day, no matter whether on weekends or during holidays
(Gregg, 2011). Likewise, with the liberation from rigid regimes
of workplace presence (such as the 9-to-5 workday or the five-
day week), work has tended to spread into the homes—living
rooms, bedrooms, kitchens—steadily eroding the bounds that
once separated work time from leisure. Gregg glosses the upshot
of these developments as follows:
Presence bleed explains the familiar experience whereby the
location and time of work become secondary considerations
faced with a “to do” list that seems forever out of control.
It not only explains the sense of responsibility workers feel
in making themselves ready and willing to work beyond paid
hours, but also captures the feeling of anxiety that arises in
jobs that have a never-ending schedule of tasks that must be
fulfilled—especially as they are not enough workers to carry
the load. (. . . ) With the increased use of digital technology,
workloads that may have been acceptable to begin with are
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show to accumulate further expectations and responsibilities
that aren’t being recognized—and never will be, if home-based
work continues to go unremarked. The purported convenience
of the technologies obscures the amount of additional work they
demand (Gregg, 2011, 2).
As these considerations show, presence bleed is not a matter
of technological availability and increased task regimes
alone—under the surface of permanent industriousness
and “always-on” availability lurk pervasive affective tendencies.
In fact, a concept like “structure of feeling” (Williams, 1977) is
adequate, as we deal here not merely with some affective coloring
or accompaniment of certain operative processes in labor,
but with a far-reaching “mental infrastructure,” with complex
patterns of affect and affective relations that play important
operative roles in the universe of contemporary white collar
work.
Feelings of guilt, of responsibility, various fears, and anxieties
are part and parcel of this near-ubiquitous constellation, but
also the excitement of connection, the thrill of being part of the
action as it unfolds, or the many petit affections that spring up in
workplace contacts—contacts which, not incidentally, have been
rebranded as “friends” in the online culture of social networking
(Gregg, 2011, ch. 5 and 6). It is this rampant blend of feelings
and affective tendencies that characterized the contemporary
dispositive of white-collar work in developed societies. In the
neo-Marxist parlor of Franco “Bifo” Berardi, the upshot of this
reads thus:
Putting the soul to work: this is the new form of alienation.
Our desiring energy is trapped in the trick of self-enterprise,
our libidinal investments are regulated according to economic
rules, our attention is captured in the precariousness of virtual
networks: every fragment of mental activity must be transformed
into capital (Berardi, 2009, 3).
If we consider the types of affects here in question, we find
among them the following: fear of being overwhelmed by the
mass of messages waiting after an oﬄine period, the anxieties of
disconnection, being at risk of missing relevant developments in
the office. Further, we find a recurring craving for the ambivalent
satisfaction that constant communication provides, but certainly
also those painful emotions of searing self-beratement as guilt
or shame—creeping upon one in face of potential shortcomings
in fulfilling one’s work demands or failure of living up to
office etiquette. Heightened feelings of inadequacy—the sense
of notoriously lagging behind the standards relevant in one’s
professional domain—are in part a structural effect of new
cultures of transparency, all-out openness, of network-enabled
comparisons to competitors around the globe. Or think of the
pervasive forms of workplace competition brought about by
advanced performance metrics as part of new regimes of data-
driven management.
As a deceptively simple example, consider the way an
unanswered e-mail message can weigh upon one, exerting a
subtle affective pressure until one finally goes about answering.
In short, there is an intricate formation of various affective
tendencies, complexly knotted-up with mobile and networked
technologies, with current management styles, with the symbolic
meaning of productivity and laboriousness, with structural
pressures in times of flexibilized and casualized labor conditions,
and with deep transformations in communication and
networking habits in general. While these broader transformative
tendencies in the present-day knowledge economy are well-
documented in recent sociological and cultural studies literature
(e.g., Liu, 2004; Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005; Gill and Pratt,
2008; Ross, 2009; Gregg, 2011), philosophers of emotion have
so far shown little interest into these messy feelscapes of
contemporary work.
For my purposes, it suffices at this point to briefly zoom
into this dense web of practices and affects in order to identify
exemplary tendencies of affective “mind invasion.” Just consider
again the practice of e-mail use in white-collar work—to stick
with one of the presumably least remarkable examples. There
is an excitement, a certain restless expectancy about possessing
an active e-mail account, as all even only remotely connected
participants in the information economy will readily testify.
With little regard to how boring and routine the content of
most messages de facto is, we tend to eagerly await them,
keep checking our inboxes repeatedly, and do it on all sorts of
occasion over and over again. E-mail is part of a double-edged
strategic constellation in which affectivity plays a pivotal role. The
excitement inherent in the communication and connectedness
enabled by e-mail is the tied up with a frantic anxiety about
losing track or being left out of relevant procedures at work.
The inbox has become the employees prime opening into the
world. The corporate office—while less and less a stable presence
in physical space—takes occupancy in one’s portable computer
or smartphone. Shutting off the connection equals leaving the
scene of action, losing track, waning rapidly from the circle of
insiders—or at least, so it will seem, so it will feel.
In terms of situated affectivity, the affects of connectedness
that mobile communication technologies engender do show a
surface resemblance to the handbag case described by Colombetti
and Krueger, but this parallel does not run very deep—not least
because the affects of workplace connectedness are under much
less individual control. While the handbag enables a collection
of handpicked items of personal comfort to be reliably present
when needed, ones mobile devices are buzzing with customized
heteronomy, as they let the frantic halo of the information
workplace seep into one’s intimate sphere of existence—with little
regard for individual coping strategies or the determined resolve
of the well-organized.
Examples such as these provide a welcome counterpoint
to the user/resource model. As we have seen, much of the
situatedness debate so far foregrounds deliberate augmentations
of select mental capacities—often rather unambiguous, clearly
beneficial support structures and devices. But in fact, web-
based communication technologies are part of a mental
augmentation structure with a far more wide-ranging, complex
and ambivalent character. These devices and the communicative
infrastructure they belong to are double-edged in that they exert
structuring pressures on everyday routines, including affective
tendencies. While they enable communicative feats of various
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kinds and remote access to the workplace and to relevant
flows of information, they establish affective habits of rampant
attentiveness, lead to hectic efforts in staying tuned, kindle
anxieties of disconnection, and often provide sustained access
to a sphere of activity and relatedness that quickly exceeds
what an individual employee can reliably process. The world
of unlimited access, while empowering, also encroaches upon
various spheres of existence. It compresses time and place, it
spares few spans of a knowledge workers lifetime from its
influence, it helps set up and enforce encompassing regimes
of attention-deployment, constant readiness, availability, and
enforced productivity.
All of this provides backing for the claim I developed
more abstractly above: socially instituted structures of feeling,
concretely realized in domain-specific ways in technological
infrastructures and affective interaction routines, affective styles,
and comportments of domain members, exert far-reaching
structuring effects upon those that dwell in these domains.
Conspicuous among them are cases where a pleasurable, joyful,
or otherwise affectively rewarding experience is generated as
part of routines that also work in draining, exploitative, anxiety-
evoking ways. In the long run, these routines may not only
exhaust the quality of life of those involved in them, but turn
them into prime exponents and “willing executioners” of the very
domains, practices and process modes that have effected these
feats.
OUTLOOK: TOWARD A POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY OF MIND
We have good reasons to consider these affect-channeling
structures of workplace technology cases of “mind invasion.”
Obviously, we should not take the talk of mind invasion in an
overly simplistic way, as if it was clear what a noninvaded mind
would look like, or whether there could even be such a thing.
In a more general sense, the adult human mind is structurally
invaded—this is the point of the niche construction perspective,
namely, that man-made environments back-form the mental
make-up (and much else) of its regular inhabitants. And it
is surely difficult to clearly demarcate those mental structures,
contents or processes that are in a specific way privileged as the
“true self ” or the kernel of the autonomous person, from those
structures, contents, or processes that are recognizable as alien
impositions from without. It can be hard to tell, in a given case,
what deserves my wholehearted endorsement—and what is an
unwanted mind invader instead.
The human mind is always inevitably a partial crystallization
of its ambient culture—it often reflects more than consciously
adopts the templates, contents, and habitual styles prevalent in
its formative surround. We have little choice than to become
exponents, more or less typical exemplars of our ambient culture,
in ways we are hardly conscious of (see e.g., Rorty, 1988). Still,
we can—by means of careful probing and analysis—distinguish
enabling from disabling social structures, we can assess to what
extent social domains work toward setting up mental patterns
that are in the long run empowering, conducive to individual
and collective flourishing, or whether they are rather creating
unhealthy dependencies, tie us to oppressive routines, sustain
inequality, destroy communal bonds or lead to affective, and
other mental habits that are detrimental to us or our kin (see also
Honneth, 2012, esp. ch. 9 and 10).
In effect, we are here led to acknowledging the deeply political
nature of situated affectivity and on the politics of the so-called
4EA perspective—the embodied, embedded, enactive, extended,
and affective mind—more generally (see Protevi, 2009, 2013).
As the examples I have discussed above make clear, not all
social domains habituate their participants’ affectivity in ways we
can or should approve of. A sufficiently rich understanding of
situated affectivity is needed in order to make these problematic
constellations visible and to help those concerned see beyond
the surface of positive attachment relations to their troubling
backsides. This issue is so vexing because the very subjects whose
evaluative outlooks are needed to make these critical assessments
are themselves the targets—and ultimately, the “products”—of
these formative influences. Affective attachments to and within
complex social domains are a crucial dimension among those
factors that constitute us as persons. Accordingly, it might seem
questionable whether there can even be so much as a space
for critical assessment of those very domains, practices and
routines which have brought about our subjective and evaluative
perspectives in the first place. How can there be enough critical
distance when it is in fact the case that, plainly, we are our
sustained affective attachments (Berlant, 2012; see also Butler,
1997, 2015)?
To address this challenge, I think a viable “political philosophy
of mind” needs to join forces with those working on affect in
cultural studies: With their careful case studies of segments of
everyday life, these scholars have pioneered a mode of critical
analysis that is finely attuned to the intricacies of domain-specific
affective modulation (e.g., Stewart, 2007; Ahmed, 2010; Gregg,
2011; Berlant, 2012; Blackman, 2012; Cvetkovitch, 2012). The
sustained formative effects of socio-political reality on individual
frames of mind are studied from the vantage point of an
“enlightened involvement.” Only as those directly concerned and
involved—which ultimately includes all of us—can we hope to
wrestle reflective insights from our ongoing entanglements with
social structures of feeling. This requires a stance of sympathetic
self-criticism that enables the careful—and potentially quite
painful—probing and questioning of the very attachments,
affective ties, and relational constellations that make us who we
are.
Political philosophical of mind is impossible without the
acknowledgment that even our dearest attachments and
emotional habits are as much part of the problem that they
might be—or might be turned into—a solution: into what assists
us in “making it through the day” (Gregg, 2011, 88), but also
whatmight eventually open up avenues for social transformation.
Recent work on affect in cultural studies—for example by Lauren
Berlant, Sara Ahmed, Lisa Blackman, or Melissa Gregg—can
inspire and aid a sensitive philosophy of mind toward such a
broadened, densely situated critical perspective. In this paper, I
have attempted to get this approach off the ground by sketching
a more complex understanding of situated affectivity that allows
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us to bring the problem of affective “mind invasion” on the
philosophical agenda.
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